Introduction
The newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were among the most enthusiastic adopters of free market reforms. In the 1990s, not only did they adopt most of the policies of the "Washington consensus" advocated by international financial institutions, such as trade and price deregulation, enterprise privatization, currency convertibility, and monetary stabilization (Williamson 1991 Pension privatization and the flat tax, like other second-stage institutional reforms (Naim 1994; Birdsall & Graham 1998; Krueger 2002) , were enacted in an effort to attract foreign investment. Both benefited the rich more than the poor and both signaled a government commitment to the free market. While advocates often claim that the flat tax increases government revenues and is therefore easy to implement, in fact both are costly reforms, entailing substantial increases in government debt in the case of pension privatization and foregone revenue in the case of the flat tax. 2 We find that these highly similar liberal reforms differed in one crucial respect. The established international financial institutions (IFIs) and other Washington-based organizations allocated enormous financial resources to support the adoption of pension privatization in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but they did not support the adoption of the flat tax. Instead, the flat tax was disseminated by a coalition of mostly domestic policy entrepreneurs connected through networks of liberal think tanks. While many of these regional think tanks were supported by their counterparts in the West, they were not able to deploy the overwhelming financial resources or delegated legitimacy (Barnett & Finnemore 2004 ) of the IFIs.
A comparison of the diffusion of these two policies thus enables us to contribute to a hotly debated question in political economy: In the international diffusion of policy reform, is the use of resource coercion and conditionality more important than the diffusion of ideas? Our study suggests that ideas can be powerful forces for change when spread through existing networks or communities of like-minded policy experts, even in the absence of resource coercion. Resources do affect the speed and patterns of dissemination, but they were not required for the diffusion of investor-friendly economic reforms in Eastern Europe.
These findings represent a new perspective in a literature that has emphasized the impact of coercion and material incentives over norms and ideas in East European policy choice. Much of the literature on postcommunist change has sought to disentangle internal and external influences on institutional change (Jacoby 2006; Levitsky & Way 2006; Bunce & Wolchik 2011; Borzel & Risse 2012 ). In particular, many scholars have emphasized the importance of European Union (EU) membership conditionality for shaping the policies of prospective new member states (Grabbe 2003; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudova 2005) . Kelley (2004; , for instance, showed that countries seeking to join the EU complied more often with norms when noncompliance was sanctioned through material coercion or the threat thereof. Vachudova (2005) demonstrated EU membership conditionality has been the most important force for policy change in East European countries during accession, especially in states governed by illiberal regimes that were immune to ideational appeals. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2004, 671) , emphasize an "external incentives model and in particular . . . the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption," rather than norms to explain East European policy choice. Scholars likewise have expressed concern that new East European member states will no longer comply with EU rules once the "carrot" of EU membership is gone, though some studies show that the adoption of EU directives has been quite high (Sedelmeier 2008) . In this literature emphasizing the power of conditionality, ideas are thought to produce occasional compliance primarily in states with Westernoriented liberal governments.
A comparison of the diffusion of the flat tax and pension privatization provides leverage into these debates since both of these policies spread rapidly throughout Eastern Europe at more or less the same time as EU membership negotiations. Yet the EU demanded neither of these policies as a requirement for accession. Moreover, not only did East European countries adopt these programs without any EU coercion, they did so without emulating EU countries. No EU countries had implemented a flat tax previously; and only a handful of countries had partly privatized pension systems (and then in ways that were mostly different in nature from the types of reforms that spread in Keen et al. (2006), and Frye (2010) all find competition to contribute to the spread of liberal policy ideas. Frye writes, "The need to attract foreign investment and satisfy international financial institutions compels governments of all partisan hues to pursue similar policies if only through a process of competitive emulation" (Frye 2010 13) . Keen et al. write, " The flat tax has commonly-almost universally-been adopted by new governments anxious to signal a fundamental regime shift, towards more market-oriented policies" (Keen et al. 2006, 37) . After the collapse of Communist regimes, East European countries were starved for capital and desperately needed investment to rebuild their economies. They competed with one another to attract foreign investors and implemented second-stage reforms to convince foreign investors of their commitment to creating an excellent investment climate (O'Dwyer & Kovalcik 2007) . Given this context, these countries were open to policies that claimed to be pro-investment, long after the end of the so-called period of "extraordinary politics" that some thought created a unique window of opportunity for liberal policy reform (Balcerowicz 1995 European states had the highest net financial inflows per GDP of any countries in the world, outpacing developing Asia and Latin America by a factor of two (Becker et al. 2010, 5) . One recent study shows that adoption of pension privatization was correlated with a 57.4 percent increase in the rate of foreign direct investment per GDP, largely as a result of signaling (Reece & Sam 2011 We would anticipate that the policy network with larger financial resources would have greater success in speeding the adoption of reform in more countries. However, our main finding is that this effect is less significant than one might imagine. The flat tax, supported by a policy network with far fewer resources, took slightly longer to disseminate, but actually spread to a larger number of countries. This suggests that networks armed with little more than ideas and expert authority were able to facilitate the diffusion of costly reforms under conditions of intense interstate competition for capital, when the reforms they were spreading were perceived as pro-investment.
The Reforms
The Pension Privatization Campaign Pension privatization tends to reward those with high incomes and consistent, long-term work histories. It often is introduced in an effort to control the costs of state-managed social security systems and therefore to reduce overall replacement rates -the proportion of previous income replaced by a pension. Since privatization has such important distributional consequences, the fact that so many countries could adopt it in so short a time seems nothing short of miraculous. [ Figure 1 About Here]
[ Table 1 About Here]
[ Table 2 About Here]
The Diffusion of Pension Privatization
The In the decade prior to 1994, the World Bank had lent less than 500 million dollars for pension projects (Hinz et al. 2008, 11) . After 1994, most of this money went to fund the privatization of pension systems, though some also went for reform of social security type pension systems (World Bank 2006, 13 [ Table 3 About Here]
To some extent, the resources that IFIs were able to mobilize in support of pension privatization shape the patterns of reform observed. For one, pension privatization spread more quickly and sooner than the flat tax in Eastern Europe. Whereas the flat tax adoption in the Baltic states in 1994-96 was not duplicated until Russia in 2001, pension privatization quickly gained acceptance in former communist countries after 1998 (Table 1) And in 2006, an internal World Bank evaluation report chastised the Bank's pension privatization campaign for pursuing reform in countries that lacked necessary preconditions and for failing to address issues of pension system coverage and adequacy (Kay & Sinha 2008, 6-7) .
Changes in thinking about pension privatization from within the World Bank itself appear to have had a major impact on the willingness of post-communist countries to enact reform, despite the fact that the World Bank continued lending billions of dollars in this area. This suggests that IFI ideas, rather than resources alone, were responsible for the spread of these reforms. When the ideas within the World Bank changed, diffusion stopped, despite the continued deployment of resources. In 2011, the Czech Republic ended the drought of pension privatization in Eastern
Europe with a voluntary system in which enrollees could opt to save an additional two percent of payroll tax free in an individual account, at which point three percentage points of their social security contribution would be redirected to this individual account (Drahokoupil and Domonkos 2013) . This represented a change in approach in Eastern Europe towards voluntarism and incentives to save rather than mandates. It appears to respond to some of the toughest criticisms of individual accounts and may reflect emerging trends in transnational pensions discourse. It remains to be seen whether this represents a renewal of pension privatization in Eastern Europe with somewhat different instruments and techniques.
The Flat Tax Revolution
At last count, twenty-one post-communist countries have implemented some form of the flat tax (Table 1) . 4 While these economies are regionally concentrated and all had to cope with similar legacies from decades of communism, their economies and political systems are now quite diverse, ranging from EU member states with thriving democracies and effective capitalist institutions to sultanistic autocracies with weak economic institutions. Nonetheless, they share a common approach to taxing personal income, such that a single rate is applied to the earned income of all taxpayers (usually above a certain basic threshold) regardless of whether the taxpayer's income is low or high.
The variation in the designs of the flat tax programs across the region is limited and some clear general patterns have emerged. The flat rate is applied typically over a threshold, thereby maintaining a modicum of progressiveness in personal income taxes. Thus, the very poorest citizens may still pay a zero percent tax rate. In most cases, the flat tax reform lowered the top marginal tax rates on personal income, with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania, two early flat tax countries that set their flat rates at the top marginal rates. In some countries the overnight tax cut for the taxpayers with the highest income was enormous. For example, in Ukraine in 2003 the flat tax program reduced the top rate from 40% to 13%. In Bulgaria in 2008, the top marginal tax rate fell from 24% to 10%. Similarly, in Russia the top rate fell from 30% to 13% whereas in Slovakia the top rate fell from 38% to 19%. In all of the Baltic countries, Russia, Ukraine, and Slovakia, the bottom statutory tax rate increased. However, the increase in the nominal tax rate on the poorest citizens tended to be offset by means-tested welfare side payments. A common feature of flat tax programs was the inclusion of additional tax benefits or welfare payments based on family size (as in Ukraine and Slovakia) or pension status (as in Russia). Moreover, the threshold under which income was not taxed in many cases was increased modestly or substantially. The impact of the flat tax on middle income earners tended to be neutral . In sum, the greatest immediate winners of the flat tax were those at the top of the income distribution. For the change in the tax brackets and rates in the year before and after the adoption of the flat tax program, see Table 4 .
[ Table 4 About Here]
Advocates of the flat tax emphasize various benefits, typically sidestepping the distributional consequences. First, proponents argue that the lower tax rate will generate more revenue through the so-called Laffer effect, which theorizes that taxation above an optimal rate reduces overall revenue. When a low flat rate is set, revenue grows since the lower rate drives taxpayers out of the shadow economy. Second, they argue that the lower rate may increase the tax base since the new lower rate lessens distortions and creates incentives for greater economic activity. As a result, the government can collect more revenue by drawing from a larger pool.
Third, a simpler tax system has lower administrative costs and is easier for citizens to pay and for governments to administer. In bureaucracies with low capacity like countries emerging from parliamentary support to adopt a flat tax, but the President responded to IMF pressure and thwarted flat tax reform. 6 Instead Kyrgyzstan adopted a two-tiered PIT program, 7 and a single rate PIT system waited until 2006, after a critical mass of countries had adopted the single rate.
In the case of Slovakia, the IMF representatives in the Article IV Consultation in 2003 expressed serious concerns about the budgetary impact of the flat tax and encouraged Slovakia to implement it over three years rather than one year as the government preferred. 8 In Romania, the IMF opposed any tax cuts given expected budgetary gaps, and was actively promoting tax increases, especially in consumption taxes (Heath 2006, 97-98) . The former head of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF unambiguously opposed the flat tax, arguing that flat taxes were a poor policy choice in economies with great income inequality. 9 In a similar vein, the European Union did not advocate flat taxes in Eastern Europe.
Personal income tax rates were outside the competence of the EU and the Commission remained silent on flat tax reforms across the region. By contrast, leaders in old member states did speak out against low corporate income taxes in Eastern Europe shortly prior to accession-despite the fact that corporate tax rates largely fell outside the EU's domain. However, East European leaders rejected these criticisms with apparent offense (Appel 2011) .
Given that neither the IMF nor the European Union was behind this liberal economic reform, how did the flat tax spread to so many countries? Instead of a unified, well-endowed, Sweden. Also vital were the first Estonian think tanks, created years earlier by the same parties that had just come to power. Most of the reform agenda was presented and discussed at events organized by these think tanks, making the public familiar with the details. Without these think tanks, the fast and effective buildup of a government action plan would probably not have been possible.
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More obliquely, foreign conservative think tanks were also influential in Slovakia's tax reform. Key members of Slovakia's reform team who implemented the flat tax spent much of the 1990s in Slovak think tanks, given their explicit exclusion from the government and statecontrolled business sector by the anti-democratic Mečiar regime (Mathernová & Renčko, 2006, 638 While the main forces propelling the diffusion of the flat tax come from within the region, leading American think tanks played a key secondary role. In sum, they organized conferences and meetings, sponsored politicians and policy entrepreneurs, supported think tanks and showered accolades and awards upon the most politically successful flat tax reformers.
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The local politicians who advocated flat tax reform commonly relied upon a set of arguments related to international competitiveness. When advocating the flat tax, Eastern
Europeans often warned that if their country did not adopt a flat tax, it would fall behind the others that had. In other words, the diffusion of the flat tax model became a source for further diffusion-a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. The data analysis presented in Baturo and Gray (2009) show that as the number of countries with a flat tax rose, so did the probability that a new country would adopt a flat tax, given particular domestic conditions. Emphasizing foreign competition, references to the experiences of other countries can be found in public statements and party platforms of proponents with great frequency (Appel 2011) . As Czech Premier Topolanek stated, "We have no choice anyway because Slovakia has already gone ahead" (Kandell 2004, 1) . Former Hungarian Prime Minister and leader of FIDESz party, Viktor Orban stated, "We are considering it, the flat tax. We're losing our competitive advantage to countries reform did occur and took on some of the characteristics from flat tax reforms, namely by lowering the top rates for top income earners and reducing the number of tax brackets (Majcen, Verbic, & Cok 2007, 9; OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2008, 14) .
In sum, when the right political conditions emerged, right-wing actors succeeded in their liberal tax reform. This occurred without a well-endowed international actor like the IMF or the EU, providing incentives or support for its realization. Instead, energetic local actorspoliticians, party leaders and members of think tanks-pursued this agenda, benefiting from multi-level, multinational collaboration and support.
Ideas or Resources?
The pension privatization and flat tax revolutions were similar reforms sponsored by different organizations within a broad network of supporters of liberal economics. Pension Our main conclusion is that neither material incentives nor membership conditionality was required for diffusion, contrary to the findings in much of the literature on EU accession. We suggest instead that policy-based competition for mobile investment allowed for the rapid adoption of these reforms in Eastern Europe. East European countries adopted liberal policies because they were short of domestic capital after decades of communism and needed to attract foreign direct investment. Policies like pension privatization and the flat tax signaled a commitment to low rates of taxation in future and benefited high-income individuals most of all.
In this context, ideological entrepreneurs found the opportunity to sell policies that promised to send the right signals to investors. (Table 2 ). This suggests that geographically connected networks of policy entrepreneurs without access to material resources are unlikely to shape policymaking outside that geographic space, whereas reforms backed by a major IFI have greater cross-regional scope.
Third, while the vast majority of governments adopting these two pro-investment, liberal economic reforms were, quite naturally, right-wing governments, in the case of pension privatization early adopters also came from governments controlled by the left. Curiously, some of the earliest countries adopting pension privatization were led by left-wing governments (namely in Hungary in 1998 and Poland in 1999) . This suggests that reform campaigns with greater resources may be able to appeal to an ideologically diverse audience, even at the crucially important early stage when neighboring exemplars do not exist. This can be achieved through public relations campaigns that work to convince potential opponents, as in the pension privatization campaign (Orenstein 2008) . In flat taxes, well-positioned, right-wing politicians and parties were essential to the adoption of the flat tax (Baturo & Gray 2009 , Appel 2011 .
Given the short-term distributional consequences of both of these programs, one might have expected these reforms to encounter greater resistance from traditional left-wing constituencies. These reforms promised long-term benefits to all income classes, but these were by no means guaranteed or backed by much empirical evidence. The benefits for all were dependent upon the programs producing positive macroeconomic gains in the future. Yet the benefits of these two liberal reforms for a few of the wealthiest members in society were direct, substantial, and immediate. Moreover, both these reforms imposed substantial costs that had to be absorbed from general revenues. Using James Q. Wilson's (1995 Wilson's ( [1973 ) typology, these are both reforms with diffuse costs and concentrated benefits. And since the material benefits associated with their implementation were highly concentrated and short-term and their potential costs were diffuse in the short term, they were more politically feasible than other programs that might similarly (and more directly) signal a favorable investment climate, for example labor market reform.
Indeed the fact that policy entrepreneurs successfully portrayed the flat tax as representative of a commitment to free markets and international competitiveness leads us directly to the role that networks of think tanks and politicians played in the diffusion of these programs. Policy entrepreneurs selected these reforms from a broad menu of possible economic reforms, championed them, and convinced politicians that implementing them would help countries compete within a highly integrated, international economy.
Given the temporal distribution of benefits and costs, domestic policy entrepreneurs were able to sell these reforms with or without major external pressure and resources. Pension privatization and the flat tax, major distributive reforms with a significant impact on these societies, took off in post-Communist countries without the membership conditionality of the European Union and, in the case of the flat tax, without loan conditionalities of IFIs. While resources beyond expert legitimacy appear to have been less important in these cases, they did have some impact by determining patterns of reform.
In conclusion, this study suggests that under competitive conditions, policy entrepreneurs who innovate at home and spread their ideas abroad can be major drivers of policy adoption and diffusion. IFIs, which have often been thought to be important for their material incentives and coercive resources alone, seem to be most important for their ideas. Increasingly, the World Bank sees itself as a "knowledge bank," with resources that are primarily expert and ideational in character (World Bank 2011). Our study suggests that this is a largely accurate picture as the impact the World Bank had on pensions is largely commensurate with the one that liberal think tanks had on the flat tax revolution: popularizing and spreading the ideas. This does not mean that resources do not matter, but that in the case of investor-friendly second-generation reforms, the networks and policy communities they build to spread ideas matter more. Holzmann and Guven (2009, 8-9) , Khasanbaev and Pfau (2010) .
(L) indicates left government or coalition involved in legislating reform. 
